In this presentation I will join the claim that a better understanding of the water-energy-food nexus needs a system perspective, where cross-sectoral impacts and linkages among the water, energy and food systems are explicitly taken into account. I suggest that while doing so is beneficial and needed, it also poses conceptual, methodological and practical challenges for how issues of uncertainty –deficits of information and ambiguities- ought to be addressed. When following a nexus approach uncertainties become interdependent and influencing each other (e.g., uncertainties associated with water quantity are not separated from those of water quality, food production and energy consumption). The water system is not independent from the food system or the energy system. These three systems are in constant interaction, mutual adaptation and change, and so are the role of uncertainties. Being aware of these relatedness and interdependencies among systems have tremendous implications for how decisions are made. Here I will draw on examples from water management to explore the implications that a water-energy-food nexus approach may impart in addressing uncertainties and in determining their function and use in decision making.
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Shale gas development has been heralded as a game changer that has had and will continue to have repercussions for future energy scenarios around the world. This paper examines actual and potential developments in unconventional production and considers how, in the context of increased demand, instability in key producing regions, and societal aversion to the risks of nuclear energy, shale gas is seen as the transition fuel to a low carbon future. This “golden future” however has come head to head with increasing concerns over water as a limiting factor. There is conflicting evidence on the potential environmental impacts of shale production, which may have direct or indirect impact on water availability and quality.
The objective of the paper is to compare relevant policies and regulatory frameworks around hydraulic fracturing in order to evaluate the extent to which energy security has been increased at the expense of water security. Particular emphasis is put on the water and energy nexus by examining as case studies two arid regions where “trading” water and energy securities could be particularly important: Texas and Spain. Each entity is a self-governing economic power existing within the context of a larger governmental or institutional structure (i.e. the United States and the European Union). The paper compares the regulatory, institutional, and cultural contexts of the two jurisdictions of study in order to evaluate the robustness of the frameworks to prevent the reduction in water security as a consequence of the pursuit of energy security. The industry in each case is at a different level of development, but these differences may be instructive. In particular, the experience of Texas, seen as the pioneer in the industry, may offer lessons for Spain as that country debates early steps into hydraulic fracturing exploration, albeit within very different regulatory and cultural contexts. Paucity of data is discussed. Also considered are potential regulatory problems related to water security, such as disclosure of information about the chemical composition of fracking fluids, arguments over trade secrets, and implications for water quality. Lessons are drawn on how to guarantee water security while pursuing energy security.
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The water‐energy‐food‐security nexus put forward by the Bonn2011 Conference highlights the need for an integrative approach towards issues of water, energy and food, and puts them under a general framework of security and resilience. While acknowledging the need for integrative solutions in terms of sustainability, the nexus approach, at the same time, makes a normative claim to tackle the needs of the poorest parts of the world population. A closer look at the underlying rationales and proposed policy instruments, however, suggests that the primary scope of the approach is not a normative one, but one that reframes the conflict between distributional justice and the needs of the world economy under the paradigm of security. Reading this slightly shifted perspective through a Foucauldian lens, I propose that security is put forward as the key mechanism to foster a new ‘green’ economy, and that the needs of the poorest are, if anything at all, a secondary effect of the proposed nexus approach. The talk will be based on Leese and Meisch 2015 and in addition suggests possible implications and alternative options for environmental politics.
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Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is a common mechanism for addressing externality problems among different natural resource users. Moreover, in the water-energy-food-land nexus context, PES is considered as a mechanism to integrate and coordinate claims and interests of different sectoral actors. This is, for example, the case, when downstream hydroelectric plants (for energy), water utilities and irrigation water users (for food) pay upstream farmers to adopt land use changes which seek to improve ecosystem service provision, thus reducing sedimentation and increasing or maintaining water quantity and quality. Concerns from several societal actors, however, question PES as win-win-win mechanism for environmental conservation, poverty alleviation and as a nexus-panacea. Among others, some of these concerns refer to top-down decision making processes and land/food insecurity of local upstream farmers that have to face strict and ill-compensated land use restrictions. Based on a PES case study in Colombia, where a hydroelectric pays for upstream conservation, this paper analyses the extent to which PES implementation has incorporated the nexus framing into local resource governance and its implications for rural livelihoods. Our findings show how powerful actors (mainly those paying for ecosystem services provision) are able to incorporate their interests into PES institutions, while excluding the interests of less powerful natural resource users located upstream (those that may be receiving PES) and downstream of the ES buyers (those who are not even considered in PES deals).
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