The Rogun Dam in the Amu Darya basin is expected to increase energy security in the upstream but it may negatively impact the downstream irrigation. Using a hydro-economic basin management model, this study contributes quantified analysis of the impact of the dam construction on energy security and downstream water availability. Results show that cooperative basin-wide maximization of benefits would lead to large increases in upstream hydropower production and only minor changes in downstream irrigation benefits. However, if upstream are managed unilaterally to maximize energy production, hydropower benefits might more double while irrigation benefits greatly decrease, thereby substantially reducing overall benefits.
Presentation

Basin Organizations are well placed to expand integrated water resources management into governance of the water-energy-food nexus, addressing challenges of sustainable hydropower, balancing the production of bioenergy with food production and taking into account the energy needs of water. With ecosystems at the centre and sustainable development and human wellbeing as key outputs, the inter-linkages between water, food and energy can be better understood and balanced.
Learning from many examples, we have formulated four main recommendations to guide governance of the nexus by basin organisations. These recommendations are: 1. Establish a high-level mandate to coordinate and cooperate between the water, energy, food and environment sectors; 2. Build partnerships across sectors, levels (including the local level) and with the private sector; 3. Identify mutual benefits and coordinate planning, as well as implementation, of common solutions; 4. Build capacity on expanding the knowledge base, analytical tools and institutional capacity.
Coordinated governance can improve energy, water and food security, foster synergies, manage trade-offs, support sustainable development, maintain or restore ecosystems and the services they provide to society. Water resources are essential for all targeted sectors, and basin organisations have practical experience integrating multiple disciplines and levels and work across sectors. Basin organisations can thus be ideal catalysts to help govern the water-energy-food nexus. At the same time, effective solutions will depend on partnerships that bring together water stakeholders with energy, food and ecosystem stakeholders.
Presentation

In international river basins, hydropower projects (HPPs) generate multiple cross-border and cross-sectoral interdependencies related to the water-energy-food-environment nexus. Governing them relies on voluntary negotiations between the water-, energy-, and environmental ministries or agencies of the countries involved, but also private companies, civil society actors and international donors may play a role. It can be assumed that the actors involved have incentives to engage in international cooperation related to hydropower if cooperation increases net benefits compared to unilateral projects. It is being argued that such negotiations may be facilitated by regional organizations, such as international river basin organizations (RBOs), which may reduce uncertainty and transaction costs by providing credibility, neutrality, information and financial means. In particular, in the case of hydropower they may also seek to reduce negative environmental and social effects. However, it is less clear what clout international RBOs really have in dealing with HPP. Instead there are indications that regional energy organizations (REGs) may also play a role. The paper therefore explores the role of international RBOs and REGs respectively in managing water-energy-environment interlinkages related to HPP on shared rivers.
It does so by scrutinizing four cases in which either international RBOs or REGs are playing a role in ongoing negotiations on HPPs. These include a comprehensive literature review on the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong main stem in Laos and own empirical investigations on the Rusumo Falls HPP by Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania on the Kagera River, the Ruzizi III HPP by Burundi, DR Congo and Rwanda on the Ruzizi River, as well as on hydropower development on the Coruh River by Turkey and Georgia.
The paper finds that in the donor-supported Kagera case the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as an international RBO has been able to mediate the project and to foster the application of environmental and social safeguards, however, with substantial donor backing. In the case of the Xayaburi dam – developed without donor support – the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had a very moderate influence on dam design. In the case of Ruzizi III a REG, Energy of the Great Lakes (EGL), is playing an important role in mediating ongoing negotiations and even initiated the set up of the international Lake Kivu RBO in order to protect the HPP from negative land use impacts; still donors insist on environmental and social safeguards. On the Coruh, an impasse in transboundary water negotiations was at least partly overcome by a bilateral deal of the Georgian and Turkish Energy Ministers setting up a bilateral committee for electricity trade; still it is unlikely that this arrangement will also address negative environmental effects. Hence, not only international RBOs but also REGs may play a role in fostering cooperation on HPPs on shared rivers, and may in some cases even be more successful than RBOs. However, REGs might be less concerned with the environmental and social effects on such projects. Hence, international RBOs may still be important for bringing these issues on the agenda, so are international donors if involved.
Presentation

At transboundary level, synergies, linkages and trade-offs among Water-Energy-Food security which are impacted by endogenous and exogenous drivers cannot be captured and studied if there is no horizon for cooperation among riparian countries. In other word, Absence of cooperation makes it impossible for countries to manage shared water resources to improve situations for all kinds of development and human progress. Meanwhile, implementation of trans-boundary cooperation is particularly challenging in river basins with long history of varied interests, lack of confidence and conflicts, Eastern Nile basin is a striking example.
We develop a model to understand the effects of economic gain expansion on cooperative agreements to encourage regional cooperation among the Eastern Nile Basin countries, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, in fields beyond water to increase interdependency, regional security and decrease the possibility of conflicts. Using a hydro-economic simulation model of Eastern Nile, we determine the economic value of cooperation emphasizing agriculture and hydropower production by calculating the economic benefits of each country under four scenarios of status quo and full cooperation with and without Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
The game is structured as a three-player trust game in which each player represents decision makers of one of the Eastern Nile riparian countries as upstream, midstream and downstream. By offering various set of options to players, we examine whether economic payoffs, compensations and incentives would foster a culture of trust and transparency for sustained cooperation within controlled environment of a laboratory setting. Results of the simulation model of Eastern Nile, provides payoff options assigned to each scenario as a set of choices for players to decide on. A win-for-all situation would be where all players receive the amount of water they required, or receive equitable compensation for any deficits in allocation from other team members.
The study would also be inclusive by conducting questionnaire-based survey to the native water experts, decision-makers and academics. Responses from the questionnaire create a system of inclusion to compare factors and social values or objectives, in other words capturing priority of riparian countries’ interests and intentions towards basin-wide cooperation. We use political and economic aspects of consultation process on the Eastern Nile issues, to demonstrate the dynamic nature of a negotiating process and its influencing factors such as long-term economic beneficiaries, to explain its possible outcomes in less sophisticated situation.
The combination of approaches applied in this study illustrates how transboundary cooperation is preferred alternative where benefits from cooperation will exceed gains from non-cooperation while the main challenge is to make benefits of cooperation transparent, attractive and equitable to all decision-makers ergo aiding them for cooperation. It also highlights the opportunities to demonstrate how benefit sharing could be used as a framework to investigate the water-energy-food linkages and tradeoffs in a transboundary context and to develop a multi-country water-energy-food model.
Presentation